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PAINFULLY PRESCRIBED: COULD TAKING OPIOIDS AS LEGAL 
TREATMENT RESULT IN DISCRIMINATION UNCOVERED BY 
THE ADA? 
ABSTRACT 
Amended in 2008, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), with its sole 
mission to protect individuals with disabilities, is still gaping with holes in 
coverage due to recent court interpretations. One such interpretation is the lack 
of protection for patients being treated with legally prescribed medications. 
With widespread misconceptions about opioid use and its effects, employers take 
adverse action upon their employees seeking necessary treatment. This paper 
will discuss the harmful consequences of courts narrowly interpreting the ADA 
against coverage of these patients, as well as the potential revitalization of the 
ADA’s mission in pending actions. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cindy, a mother of three from the Midwest, struggled with lower back pain 
for years after developing arthritis. Cindy tried relieving the pain through 
physical therapy, Tylenol, muscle relaxants, and Aspirin. However, the sharp, 
stabbing pain continues to keep her awake at night, prevents her from taking her 
usual walks with her husband, and makes watching her son’s basketball games 
difficult. After conducting a risk assessment on Cindy, Dr. Edmondson, Cindy’s 
physician, prescribes Cindy hydrocodone, a short-acting, non-Schedule II opioid 
with a 1 Morphine Equivalent Conversion Factor/mg of Opioid (MME), to be 
taken for the next twelve weeks with biweekly check-ups. Though Cindy 
sometimes feels nauseated, dizzy, and drowsy after taking the medication, she 
is no longer in severe, stabbing pain. About a month into her treatment period, 
Cindy, who has been a tax accountant for twenty-three years, is drug tested by 
her employer. When Cindy tests positive for hydrocodone, her employer, who 
read about the opioid epidemic online, terminates Cindy, saying he will not 
tolerate someone disrupting his drug-free workplace environment. With 
employment at-will and lack of statutory protection, Cindy has no legal recourse 
for her termination. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), amended in 2008, sought to 
protect disabled Americans, including individuals struggling with substantially 
limiting impairments, having a history of such impairments, or being regarded 
as impaired.1 Nevertheless, while the amendment was intended to cover a 
greater number of disabled individuals, court interpretations continue to leave a 
gap in coverage protection. Though courts have definitively ruled on ADA 
coverage of past addiction as a disability, they have not included the use of 
drugs, nor their effects, for legally prescribed treatment in the statutory 
definition of “disability.” Thus, discrimination while using legally prescribed 
drugs is still possible under the Act.2 
With the growing awareness of opioid abuse and its effects on physical and 
mental capabilities, courts have developed clear interpretations that dependence 
and past addiction are covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act (ADAAA).3 Yet, when opioids are used as legally prescribed, 
despite the increased knowledge of their positive treatment results, courts have 
been unclear in their interpretations of the ADAAA regarding short-term, legal 
 
 1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006) (amended 2008). 
 2. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Questions and Answers: The Americans with Disabilities Act and 
Hiring Police Officers, ADA.GOV (March 2017), http://www.ada.gov/copsq7a.htm. See, e.g., Bates 
v. Dura Auto. Sys., Inc., 650 F. Supp. 2d 754, 759, 761, 767–69, 772 (M.D. Tenn. 2009); Ferrari 
v. Ford Motor Co., 96 F. Supp. 3d 668, 675 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
 3. Is Addiction Considered A Disability By ADA?, KM&A, https://lawkm.com/addiction-dis 
ability-by-ada/ (last visited July 21, 2019). 
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opioid use.4 Particularly, courts have traditionally said such use is not covered 
under the ADA and, based on recent holdings, could find they are not covered 
under the now broader amendments to the ADA as well.5 This misapplication of 
the ADA’s purposes could lead to a gap in coverage, where individuals with 
serious pain and legally prescribed opioids to handle such pain could be 
terminated from their jobs after a drug test or medical consultation. Whereas, if 
these individuals failed to undergo their prescribed treatments and continued to 
struggle with chronic pain, or if the treatment developed into an addiction, they 
would be covered. To incentivize patients to follow prescribed treatments and 
preclude their potential termination or other adverse action for doing so, courts 
should find legally prescribed opioid use, even absent dependence or addiction, 
is a disability under the ADAAA based on the established side effects and 
generalized misperceptions of use.  
This paper will first focus on legally prescribed opioid use (as opposed to 
abuse, dependence, or addiction), its negative and beneficial consequences, and 
the opioid addiction epidemic’s impact on misperceptions, even regarding 
legally prescribed use. Section III will discuss how coverage has been 
interpreted under the ADA and how the statute’s amendments have broadened 
coverage. The following section will analyze how courts have been wrongly 
interpreting coverage even after the ADAAA was adopted. Section IV will also 
suggest a remedy for these interpretations to align with congressional intent of 
broader coverage in a case recently filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC). The paper will conclude with a discussion on the potential 
consequences of lack of coverage under the ADAAA for employees seeking 
pain relief or addiction-ending treatment. 
II.  THE INCREASING AWARENESS AND MISPERCEPTIONS OF OPIOID USE 
Opioids are “a class of drugs naturally found in the opium poppy plant” and 
are typically used as medicine to relieve “moderate to severe pain.”6 Common 
prescription opioids include: hydrocodone, like Vicodin; oxycodone, like 
Oxycontin or Percocet; oxymorphone, like Opana; morphine; codeine; and 
fentanyl.7 With an estimated 116 million Americans struggling with chronic 
pain, such as migraines, neck pain, or knee pain, and the $560 to $630 billion 
annual cost of these chronic aches, pain relievers, including opioids, have proven 
useful for the past five thousand years.8  
 
 4. See, e.g., Bates, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 759, 761, 767–69, 771–72; Ferrari, 96 F. Supp. 3d at 
675. 
 5. Bates, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 767–69, 771–72; Ferrari, 96 F. Supp. 3d at 675–76. 
 6. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, Prescription Opioids, DRUGABUSE.GOV 1 (June 2019), 
https://d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/drugfacts-prescriptionopioids.pdf. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Corey S. Davis & Derek H. Carr, The Law and Policy of Opioids for Pain Management, 
Addiction Treatment, and Overdose Reversal, 14 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2017). 
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Today, patients in the United States use opioids for treatment of acute 
postoperative pain, surgery-related chronic pain, severe cancer pain, pain in 
individuals with HIV or AIDS, and opioid addiction itself.9 Although there was 
a nineteen percent reduction “in annual prescribing rate from 2006 to 2017,” the 
prescribing rate in 2017 was still high—fifty-eight percent.10 To gauge the 
commonality of prescription opioids, consider that, in 2012, providers wrote 259 
million prescriptions for opioids, which was enough for each individual 
American adult to have a bottle of opioid pills.11 As a result, by 2015, a third of 
Americans had opioid prescriptions, and now, one in every ten employees is 
generally under some dosage of opioids at work.12 Prescriptions are more 
common in smaller communities with more uninsured or unemployed 
individuals and patients with diabetes, arthritis, or disabilities.13  
Generally, when prescribed by a doctor for short-term use, prescription 
opioids are safe.14 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommends 
such treatment in combination with nonpharmacologic therapy when the 
expected benefits would likely outweigh the risks to the patient.15 Assessing the 
risk includes reviewing the history of the patient to assess likelihood that the 
patient would abuse the drug.16 While long-term use can be safe if effectively 
monitored in some conditions, such as refractory severe nociception or 
neuropathic pain, long-term use is only appropriate for a rare number of cases 
and will not be the focus of this Comment.17 Given the established benefits of 
short-term opioid use, opioids as a secondary short-term treatment for relieving 
pain may be embraced as long as this treatment is monitored and accurately 
 
 9. Id. at 5. 
 10. Prescription Opioid Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cd 
c.gov/drugoverdose/data/prescribing.html (last updated Dec. 19, 2018) (defining MME as “a way 
to calculate the total amount of opioids, accounting for differences in opioid drug type and 
strength”). See also Calculating Total Daily Dose of Opioids for Safer Dosage, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/calculating_total_daily_ 
dose-a.pdf (last visited July 20, 2019) (considering twenty to fifty MME per day as “relatively low 
dosages”). 
 11. Dawn J. Lanouette, Opioid Addiction Enters the Workplace, ABA (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/woman-advocate/articles/2018/opiate-
addiction-workplace/. 
 12. Id.; Jack Benton, “Opioid Addiction at Work is a Major Challenge for Employers,” EHS 
SAFETY NEWS AMERICA (Aug. 1, 2017), https://ehssafetynewsamerica.com/2017/08/01/opioid-ad 
diction-at-work-is-a-major-challenge-for-employers-opiod-addiction-safety/. 
 13. Prescription Opioid Data, supra note 10. 
 14. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 6, at 1. 
 15. Deborah Dowell et al., CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain – United 
States, 2016, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Mar. 18, 2016, at 1, 17. 
 16. Id. at 18, 25. 
 17. See generally Jerome Schofferman, Long-Term Use of Opioid Analgesics for the 
Treatment of Chronic Pain of Nonmalignant Origin, 8 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 279 (1993). 
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assessed.18 For this reason, best prescribing practices are that the use of opioids 
should be temporary or episodic with periodic reviews. 
Just as with other drugs, prescription opioids may have side effects. Some 
opioid side effects include: “drowsiness, confusion, nausea, constipation, 
euphoria, [and] slowed breathing.”19 One source found “[a]s many as 80% of 
patients taking opioids experience at least one side effect.”20 The most common 
side effects of opioids as treatment are “gastrointestinal, like constipation, 
nausea, and vomiting.”21 Opioids, however, also impact the central nervous 
system through impaired concentration and memory problems, as well as 
causing dry mouth and loss of appetite.22 While most side effects tend to fade 
away with time, “[l]ong-term opioid use can lead to respiratory depression.”23 
With this slowed breathing, hypoxia may develop from lack of oxygen in the 
brain, possibly leading to “coma, permanent brain damage, or death.”24  
While these side effects affect patients differently based on the prescription, 
some studies have shown that opioid treatment can have severe impacts on 
bodily functions. One of the most prevalent side effects, constipation, is 
experienced by forty to forty-five percent of patients, sometimes becoming so 
severe that patients have to be hospitalized.25 In addition, seventy-five percent 
of patients who have been taking opioids for six months or more have sleep 
apnea.26 
Side effects of opioids are compounded when opioids are misused, such as 
taking the medicine longer or in a higher dosage than prescribed, taking 
another’s prescription, or taking opioids solely for the high effect.27 Misuse can 
cause dependence or addiction, which are distinct in scientific terminology.28 
When an individual repeatedly uses a drug, causing his or her neurons to 
function normally only if the drug is consumed, that individual develops a drug 
dependence, whereas “[d]rug addiction is a chronic disease characterized by 
compulsive, or uncontrollable, drug seeking and use despite harmful 
consequences and long-lasting changes in the brain.”29 Though addiction and 
 
 18. Dowell et al., supra note 15, at 8. 
 19. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 6, at 2. 
 20. Allie Lemco Toren, Weighing the Benefits and Side Effects of Opioids, HEALTHGRADES 
(last reviewed Feb. 3, 2018), https://healthguides.healthgrades.com/treating-opioid-induced-consti 
pation/weighing-the-benefits-and-side-effects-of-opioids. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 6, at 2. 
 25. AnGee Baldini et al., A Review of Potential Adverse Effects of Long-Term Opioid Therapy: 
A Practitioner’s Guide, 14 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION CNS DISORDERS (June 14, 2012). 
 26. Id. 
 27. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 6, at 1. 
 28. See id. at 3–4. 
 29. Id. at 3. 
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dependence are not the focus of this Comment, misconceptions about those 
behaviors are sometimes wrongly conflated with legal prescription drug 
treatment.30 
With the growing awareness of opioid misuse in the United States, the 
United States Department of Justice recognizes the pattern of abuse and fatalities 
as an “epidemic.”31 In fact, the United States “consumes more than 80% of the 
world’s opioids,” but only makes up for less than five percent of the world’s 
population.32 In 2017, the United States saw approximately 11.4 million people 
over twelve years old misuse opioids, which included approximately 7.3 percent 
of people between eighteen and twenty-five years old.33 According to the 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, prescribed pain 
relievers, which also included non-opioids in a particular study, were misused 
by 11.1 million people in 2017. The study’s results provided that hydrocodone 
products were the most commonly misused drugs.34 Although the “epidemic” is 
only related to the misuse of opioids, such as addiction or dependence, 
misconceptions based on the generalized term “opioid epidemic” cause 
“stigmatization and inappropriate treatment” of those using opioids as legally 
prescribed.35 
While the growing awareness of the opioid epidemic is helpful at addressing 
addiction as a major public health issue, both employers and courts continue to 
hold misconceptions about opioid use for legal treatment based on societal 
stereotyping of opioids as misused substances. In a press release by the EEOC, 
EEOC Philadelphia District Director Jamie R. Williamson stated,  
As the country grapples with an opioid addiction crisis, unfortunately there are 
many myths and biases about people recovering from drug addiction and the 
treatments for it. Under the ADA, employers may test for illegal drug use, but 
medically prescribed suboxone or methadone are not illegal drugs. Rather, they 
are common and effective treatments for individuals recovering from drug 
addiction, and many side effects of those treatments must be assessed on an 
individualized basis.36 
 
 30. See Kelly Dineen, Addressing Prescription Opioid Abuse Concerns in Context: 
Synchronizing Policy Solutions to Multiple Complex Public Health Problems, 40 L. & PSYCHOL. 
REV. 45–46 (2016) (explaining how the broad term “opioid epidemic,” instead of opioid-related 
overdoses, has caused doctors to discourage positive or value neutral pain treatment because all 
opioid prescriptions are mistaken as causing addiction). 
 31. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., 2015 NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT SUMMARY iii (2015). 
 32. Davis & Carr, supra note 8, at 5–6. 
 33. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND 
MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2017 NATIONAL 
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 19 (2018). 
 34. Id. at 18, 20. 
 35. Dineen, supra note 30, at 3–4. 
 36. Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Sues Appalachian Wood Products, Inc. for Disability 
Discrimination (Oct. 9, 2018). 
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Nick Szubiak, the Director for Clinical Excellence in Addictions within the 
National Council for Behavioral Health, described how society perceives 
addiction as a “moral failing” or “character defect.”37 Therefore, tying opioid 
use to addiction initiates the repercussion that society will misperceive those 
who use opioids, even for legally prescribed treatment, as not “clean” because 
society conflates all opioid use with addiction.38 One result could be regarding 
those who take opioids for pain relief, such as after surgery or for diabetes, as 
having a “moral failing” simply for getting relief and treating them as if they are 
addicted to the drug, rather than simply experiencing side effects. This societal 
conflation causes unfair discrimination for those legally taking opioids for 
medical purposes. 
III.  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADAAA 
The ADA, signed into law on July 26, 1990, was passed in order to prohibit 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities, as well as end surrounding 
stereotypes and set enforceable standards of care.39 According to Title I of the 
Act, “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate on the basis of disability in regard 
to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, 
and privileges of employment.” This requirement of the Act particularly focuses 
on terms of employment.40 A qualified individual is “an individual with a 
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or 
desires.”41 A “disability” means that there is a “physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” there is a record of an 
impairment, or an individual is regarded as having an impairment.42 
Under the ADA, coverage for legal prescription drug use has been construed 
narrowly, not covering employees, even when employees produce evidence of a 
prescription. For example, in Bates v. Dura Automotive Systems, Inc., seven 
former employees of a glass window manufacturing company, Dura, challenged 
a drug testing policy, which prohibited the use of legal prescription drugs, such 
as Xanax, Lortab, and Oxycodone, “if such use adversely affected safety, 
company property or job performance.”43 This type of policy was generally 
acceptable under the ADA in that it reinforced the employer’s ability to remove 
 
 37. Nick Szubiak, Discrimination & the Opioid Crisis 10 (presentation available at https://ccs 
me.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2017-03-01-Discrimination-and-the-Opioid-Crisis.pdf). 
 38. Id. at 30. 
 39. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2006) (amended 2008). 
 40. Id. § 12112(a). 
 41. Id. § 12111(8). 
 42. Id. § 12102(1). 
 43. Bates v. Dura Auto. Systems, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758–59, 761 (M.D. Tenn. 2009). 
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employees who directly threaten the work environment, as will be discussed 
later in this section.44 
If an employee tested positive for one or more of the twelve tested 
medications, Dura compared the adverse warnings of that drug or drugs with 
whether there was a listed danger in operating equipment or machinery.45 If 
there was a warning, Dura sent a letter to the employee that he or she would be 
placed on a thirty-day leave of absence and the employee had to transition to a 
different drug or stop using the drug.46 
After seven employees tested positive, they produced letters from their 
doctors that the drugs would not affect their work performance and refused 
Dura’s request that they take other medications.47 Dura did not consider the 
letters, despite acknowledging that the positive tests were a result of their taking 
legal, properly prescribed prescription drugs, and the employees, who continued 
taking the prescribed medication, sued under the ADA after they were 
terminated.48 
The trial court applied the original rule under the ADA, rather than the 
amended version, because the ADA was in place at the time the conduct 
occurred.49 The court found that the employees’ conditions did not “qualify 
[them] as disabled.” The court reasoned that the employees did not fall under the 
first prong of having an impairment, as a result of their underlying physical or 
mental pains, that substantially limited a major life activity.50 The court reasoned 
that the only potentially impacted major life activity was “working,” but this was 
not actually impacted because the employees were able to work.51 
This is important in the context of legally prescribed drugs specifically 
because, similar to Bates, employers typically discover the use of opioids 
through drug testing and may respond to positive drug tests by retaliating against 
employees because they could pose a danger to the workplace environment.52 
Once an employee tests positive for a drug test and the employer seeks to take 
actions against the employee, the employee must, under the first prong, show 
that he or she has an impairment that limits a major life activity.53  
 
 44. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2017). 
 45. Bates, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 759–60. 
 46. Id. at 760. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 760, 763. 
 49. Id. at 767 n.3. 
 50. Bates, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 767. 
 51. Id. 
 52. NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, THE PROACTIVE ROLE EMPLOYERS CAN TAKE: OPIOIDS IN THE 
WORKPLACE 4 (2019). 
 53. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2017). 
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Originally, under the ADA, what constituted a “major life activity” was 
construed narrowly.54 Employees could try to claim the impacted major life 
activity was working, but this raised the question of whether they were 
unqualified for their job positions with reasonable accommodation and could 
therefore be terminated.55 Under the narrow interpretation, claiming other major 
life activities was difficult, and even if those were claimed, the employer could 
still show the employee was not qualified because he or she could not perform 
the essential functions of the job.56 Employees, like those in Bates, may test 
positive for a drug test even if work is not impaired. After these employees test 
positive to a drug that has a list of negative side effects, employers may put 
employees’ qualifications and ability to do the job at issue. 
For example, prior to the drug test, employees may not have been impaired 
in their functioning. Once employees are tested, employers argue that the side 
effects—the warnings on the drug labels, such as difficulty while operating 
heavy machinery—impact work safety. If the employee wants to claim a major 
life activity is affected, he or she must also show he or she is qualified, which 
the employer has already questioned through the positive drug test and adverse 
warning label. In Bates, one plaintiff stated she was able to clean, shop, cook, 
and walk, and she never had any safety violations while on prescribed 
medications.57 Therefore, because she was taking the prescribed medication, she 
was able to do most of her daily activities, but in order to protect herself under 
the ADA from termination, she argued she was still in pain that affected her 
work, which was difficult because she was taking the medication in order to 
avoid being in pain at work. Essentially, she was faced with two options. Her 
first option was to not follow treatment recommendations and to therefore be 
protected as having an underlying impairment (chronic pain) that affected her 
work. Her second option was to take the medication to relieve her pain and to 
argue that she is still impaired in some fashion, either by the underlying pain or 
the side effects of the medication. Since work qualifications were put at issue 
with the drug test and the definition of “major life activities” was narrowly 
construed by courts, arguing that she was not impaired at work, but rather in 
another major life activity, would be difficult, and arguing she was impaired at 
work could conflict with her ability to qualify for the job position. 
Precedent under the ADA required a higher standard for “working” as a 
major life activity, so the plaintiff needed to show he or she could not work in a 
 
 54. See ADAAA Rules Expand Definition of Working as Major Life Activity, PARKERPOE (Oct. 
9, 2009), https://www.parkerpoe.com/news/2009/10/adaaa-rules-expand-definition-of-working-
as-major. 
 55. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)–(b) (2017). 
 56. Id.; see ADAAA Rules Expand Definition of Working as Major Life Activity, supra note 
54. 
 57. Bates v. Dura Auto. Sys., Inc., 650 F. Supp. 2d 754, 760 (M.D. Tenn. 2009). 
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class of jobs.58 In Bates, the plaintiffs “were all able to perform their jobs at the 
time they were terminated.”59 Those plaintiffs were able to show the reason they 
were on medication, such as for general ailments, diabetes, or asthma, impacted 
a major life activity. Still, the court did not find the plaintiffs to “qualify as 
disabled” because the medical conditions needed to be more specific to a class 
of jobs.60 For example, one plaintiff’s asthma did not constitute a disability in 
working because she could perform other job positions, just not the task of 
priming.61 
In Bates, the plaintiffs also argued under the second prong of ADA coverage 
that they had “histor[ies] of diagnosed medical impairments, have suffered 
injuries on the job, or have taken leave under the Family Medical Leave Act.”62 
The plaintiffs only occasionally missed work for surgeries or accidents, but there 
was no evidence of “continuing, long-term impairment,” so the court found there 
was no record of impairment covered under the second prong.63 
With a greater understanding on legal opioid treatment, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention has stated that “[t]he effectiveness of short-term 
opioid therapy has already been established.”64 For example, opioids are useful, 
as previously mentioned, for short-term treatment of opioid addiction or chronic 
pain, like the treatment prescribed to the plaintiffs in Bates.65 By not considering 
this type of pain as a history of impairment simply because the incidents were 
“isolated,” rather than “long-term,” the court seems to suggest that the plaintiffs 
who seek legal, short-term opioid treatment are in a less favorable legal position 
than if they had not followed the treatment because they may potentially lose 
their jobs following drug testing. The court seems to suggest that plaintiffs who 
suffer through addiction or chronic pain are in a better legal position because 
their job positions would be protected under those circumstances. As will be 
discussed, post-ADAAA statutory language suggests that legislative intent 
would prefer a different outcome by suggesting that those with “episodic” pain 
should be considered disabled and protected under the Act.66  
In Bates, the plaintiffs also failed under the third prong because, though Dura 
regarded the plaintiffs as a safety risk, the ADA required the plaintiffs to be 
regarded as “disabled” from a class of jobs, which the court found was the not 
case.67 However, the facts seem to suggest that the employer did not consider 
 
 58. See id. at 767. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 768. 
 62. Bates, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 768. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Dowell et al., supra note 15, at 8. 
 65. Davis & Carr, supra note 8; Bates, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 762. 
 66. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (2017). 
 67. Bates, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 768–69. 
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individual employee records, nor the doctors’ notes that the drugs would not 
impact ability to work, suggesting the employer did, in fact, generalize employee 
capability purely based his or her use of opioids. Today, the same plaintiffs 
would be less likely to face the same outcome because the purpose of the ADA 
is to diminish stereotyping.68 Because of the difficulty in meeting the “class of 
jobs” standard, the ADAAA broadened the scope of the third prong and removed 
the requirement that it needed to apply to a broad class of jobs.69 Additionally, 
the “regarded as” prong no longer requires that the disability impact a major life 
activity.70 Based on these changes, we would expect plaintiffs to be in a better 
position to argue for coverage under the ADAAA. 
Because of interpretations like Bates, where the ADA was construed 
narrowly and did not provide intended coverage, Congress rejected narrow 
decisions and EEOC regulations by amending the ADA.71 The ADAAA was 
signed into law on September 25, 2008 to expand coverage and promote 
successful claims under the ADA.72 While the ADAAA did not change the 
definition of disability under the law, it modified the application of the ADA by 
advising the EEOC to redefine “substantially limits,” by expanding the list of 
“major life activities” to include more activities and bodily functions, by 
clarifying that episodic impairments could be disabilities, by changing the 
definition of “regarded as” to not include “major life activity,” and by not 
entitling claims under the “regarded as” prong to reasonable accommodation.73 
For the purposes of this Comment, we will focus on the expansion of “major life 
activities,” episodic impairments, and the reclassification of “regarded as.” 
 
 68. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2006) (amended 2008); 
see Bates, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 771–72. 
 69. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12102(4)(C). 
 70. See id. § 12102(3)(A). 
 71. See id. § 12101(b); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N., NOTICE CONCERNING 
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008; Comparison of the 
ADA (as Construed by the Courts) and the ADA Amendments Act in the House (H.R. 3195) and as 
Passed by the Senate (S. 3406), DSPSSOLUTIONS 1, 1 http://www.dspssolutions.org/sites/default/ 
files/resources/differencesbetweenadaandadaaa_001.pdf (last visited July 22, 2019). 
 72. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12101(b); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N., supra note 71; Comparison of the ADA (as Construed by the Courts) and the ADA 
Amendments Act in the House (H.R. 3195) and as Passed by the Senate (S. 3406), supra note 71, 
at 1. 
 73. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12102(1–4); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N., supra note 71; Comparison of the ADA (as Construed by the Courts) and the ADA 
Amendments Act in the House (H.R. 3195) and as Passed by the Senate (S. 3406), supra note 71, 
at 3. 
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A. The ADAAA Changed Testing Points to Expand Disability Coverage 
1. The Expansion of “Major Life Activities” 
Under the first prong, the plaintiff must show he or she is substantially 
impaired in a major life activity.74 In the case of legally prescribed opioids, users 
are likely taking the medication to reduce chronic pain.75 This underlying 
chronic pain could potentially be protected as an impairment under the ADAAA 
definition of disability. However, by taking prescription opioids, individuals 
should be improving their health, considering that they are taking the medication 
for pain relief. Because of this mitigating effect, patients may instead argue that 
the effect of using opioids in itself is an impairment. As mentioned above, 
opioids can have serious effects on users, such as drowsiness, nausea, and 
slowed breathing.76 If patients are experiencing side effects that impact a major 
life activity or the underlying chronic or intermittent pain is substantially 
limiting in itself, then they should be considered impaired in one or more major 
life activities for the first or second prongs. 
As mentioned above, given the nature of drug testing, employees previously 
did not have as much flexibility in what they argued as major life activities 
because the meaning of “major life activity” was construed narrowly and an 
employer, by drug testing employees, claimed these employees were not 
qualified.77 Employees could argue they were either not substantially impaired 
in their work, thus not falling under the ADA’s first or second prongs unless 
arguing a different major life activity, or that they were substantially impaired 
in work as a major life activity, either based on the underlying condition or the 
medication’s side effects. 
The term “major life activit[y]” was expanded when the ADAAA added a 
list to further define “major life activities” as “includ[ing], but…not limited to, 
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, 
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, 
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”78 In addition to this non-
exhaustive list, general “major bodily functions,” including immune system, 
neurological, and circulator functions, could also fall under the new ADAAA 
definition. 
Recall, though, that the ADA, and now the ADAAA, only applies to 
qualified individuals, who are individuals that can “perform the essential 
 
 74. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12102(1)(a). 
 75. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 6, at 1, 3. 
 76. Id. at 2. 
 77. See ADAAA Rules Expand Definition of Working as Major Life Activity, supra note 54. 
 78. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12102(2); The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Frequently 
Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/faqs/ADAfaqs 
.htm#content (last visited Jan. 12, 2019). 
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functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”79 
Thus, if employees argue they are substantially impaired by the use of opioids, 
such as with drowsiness or decreased cognitive ability, they have to show the 
impairment is affecting a major life activity. Employees have to address whether 
they are able to perform the essential functions of their jobs or they can do so by 
reasonable accommodation without being a direct threat. If employers claim 
employees are not qualified after a positive drug test of an opioid with a safety 
warning, employees run the risk of not being classified as “qualified individuals” 
because they cannot perform the essential functions of the job, especially if their 
job positions are safety-intensive, such as operating heavy machinery, and the 
drug side effects could impact such tasks.80 By conducting drug testing, 
employers put such side effects of opioids at issue for employees who take 
prescription opioids for purposes deemed medically necessary.  
The likelihood that the same plaintiffs as those in Bates could make the same 
argument today, but be covered under the ADAAA, is higher because the ADA’s 
amendment was passed in order to expand the definition of “major life 
activity.”81 With an expanded definition, plaintiffs could better argue that there 
were other major life activities impacted rather than just working. Even if 
employers claim plaintiffs are not qualified to work after a positive drug test, the 
plaintiffs can argue they are not impacted at work but are impacted in other areas 
of their lives. With the non-exhaustive list in the ADAAA, the definition of 
“major life activity” is broadened. The broad definition is less likely to conflict 
with job qualifications than a narrow definition of major life activities, such as 
simply working. 
The purpose of the ADAAA was to expand protection by broadening the list 
of “major life activities.” Opioids impact major life activities, such as sleeping, 
performing tasks, or breathing. Thus, if employees argued they were not 
impaired at work and there were no safety complaints about the employees’ 
work like in the Bates case, the employees could argue they have impairments 
outside of work. In such a case, there would be little likelihood of contradicting 
job qualifications. Under the expanded definition of the ADAAA, plaintiffs 
would be in a better position to argue impairment of a major life activity outside 
of work based on the effects experienced from opioid treatment. 
 
 79. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12111(8). 
 80. Matthew S. Effland, Disability Accommodation Under the ADA, AMERICAN BAR, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/am/2014/1h_disability_accomm
odation.pdf (last visited July 22, 2019). 
 81. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12102(2); The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Frequently 
Asked Questions, supra note 78. 
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2. The Addition of Episodic Disability Coverage 
The ADAAA added any episodic impairment that “substantially limit[s] a 
major life activity when active” to the definition of disability.82 Episodic 
impairments do not have to be present all the time, but only have to be recurring, 
such as epilepsy, hypertension, or major depressive disorder.83 Since episodic 
chronic pain is decidedly covered by the ADAAA, this section focuses on the 
episodic use of legally prescribed opioids and its episodically experienced side 
effects.84 Because of the nature of prescription medication, employees may not 
be constantly influenced by the side effects of opioids. To ensure that employees 
are not under the influence while at work, employers conduct drug tests.85  
If prescription drugs are used off-site, there may still be side effects if, at the 
time the employee was tested, the drug is still in his or her system. Whether the 
employee tests positive depends on the type of testing, the type of opioid, and 
how the drug was used.86 The active ingredients of opioids only remain in blood 
for a few hours, so instead of blood tests, immunoassay urine tests are used to 
detect certain drugs days after use.87 The immunoassay test, though, cannot 
distinguish between legal and illegal use of opioids.88 In fact, simply eating 
enough poppy seeds can result in a positive immunoassay result.89  
Therefore, because the nature of drugs is unique in that they can be detected 
in blood or urine samples, even if a user is not experiencing any side effects, the 
user will once again be put in a situation where qualification to work is at issue 
if the test is positive. This is the case even if the employee’s work has not been 
claimed as “impaired.” Since the employer’s drug test only measures use, rather 
than impairment, and mere use can result in a positive drug test, the prescription 
drug patient may have felt the side effects episodically, though at times of the 
day other than work. By extending coverage to episodic impairments, the 
ADAAA should cover the gap that would be felt if periodic effects were not 
covered. 
 
 82. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12102(4)(D). 
 83. Questions and Answers on the Final Rule Implementing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/ada_qa_final_ 
rule.cfm (last visited July 22, 2019). 
 84. See Eastman v. Research Pharm., Inc., No. 12-2170, 2013 WL 3949236, at *1, 8–9 (E.D. 
Penn. Aug. 1, 2013). 
 85. Frieda Paton, Managing Opioids in the Workplace, WORKPLACE TESTING (Oct. 30, 2018), 
https://www.workplacetesting.com/2/4050/occupational-health-and-safety/managing-opioids-in-
the-workplace. 
 86. See Opioids, 237 HR SERIES POLICIES & PRAC. 11 (Jan. 2019). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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3. The New Standards of the “Regarded As” Clause 
To fall under the ADAAA protections, an employee only has to fall under 
one of the three prongs. An employee can avoid having to show that a major life 
activity was impaired by claiming he or she falls under the third prong, rather 
than the first or second prongs, of the definition of disability.90 If a plaintiff 
argues that he or she has a claim under the third prong, the plaintiff must show 
that he or she is regarded as having an impairment.91 The impairment does not 
have to impair a major life activity, unlike the other two prongs, thus the third 
prong may provide a more encouraging route for some employees who claim 
they are not literally impaired, but rather are perceived as such, while at work.92 
However, this prong does not apply to impairments that are “transitory and 
minor.”93 These include impairments “with an actual or expected duration of 6 
months or less.”94 To show this prong, the employee must show that the 
employer thought or would expect the impairment to last at least six months. 
This lowered the previous standard, where plaintiffs had to show that they were 
regarded as impaired in a major life activity. 
B. An Employer’s Defense: How the ADAAA Provides Tools to Employers’ 
Benefit 
Though the ADAAA broadened coverage, the ADA and its amendments still 
protect employers by limiting certain drug use in the workplace that could 
impact productivity and safety. Recent studies suggest that costs of opioids are 
a large factor of employer concern, since opioid abuse costs employers about ten 
billion dollars annually to lost productivity and absenteeism.95 As many as “one-
third of prescription painkillers paid for by employer-funded plans are being 
abused.”96 But, disability coverage does not extend to the use of illegal drugs.97 
“[I]llegal use of drugs” does not include “the use of a drug taken under 
supervision by a licensed health care professional, or other uses authorized by 
the Controlled Substances Act or other provisions of Federal law.”98 Also, in the 
Code of Federal Regulations, this statutory language has been interpreted to 
mean that legal use of prescribed drugs does not deprive a person of protection 
 
 90. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) (2017). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at § 12102(3)(A). 
 93. Id. at § 12102(3)(B). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Riia O’Donnell, As Opioids Hit the Workforce, Employers are Forced to Improvise, 
HRDIVE (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.hrdive.com/news/as-opioids-hit-the-workforce-employers-
are-forced-to-improvise/449471/; Benton, supra note 12. 
 96. O’Donnell, supra note 95. 
 97. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6)(A) (2006) (amended 
2008). 
 98. Id. 
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under the ADA; yet, the Code does not specify whether such use is protected, 
just that the use is not excluded.99 Thus, the regulation leaves open the 
possibility that legal prescription drug use could be covered by the ADAAA, but 
does not specifically cover it, so it can still be excluded if interpreted as such. 
High costs of abuse and the lack of statutory protection heighten employer 
concerns of detecting drug abuse in the workplace, thus increasing the use of 
drug tests. Employers may still require drug testing to promote a drug-free 
workforce of prescription medications.100 Employers conduct drug testing, 
including those of legally prescribed drugs, in order to address danger of injuries, 
lost productivity, and potential liability.101 Their argument is that the opioid side 
effects of “drowsiness, poor memory and confusion, [and] decreased cognitive 
functioning” can “lead to altered judgement as well as slower movement and 
reaction time in the workplace.”102 If the employee tests positive for prescription 
medications, the employer should ask the employee to provide his or her 
prescription.103  
If employees are covered by the ADAAA after the upcoming case, EEOC v. 
Appalachian Wood Products, Inc., then upon learning an applicant or employee 
uses opioids, an employer may need to consider its practices and procedures for 
drug testing, terminations, and transfers. Employers may also have the added 
cost of drug use as a reasonable accommodation, a policy development that has 
been hindered by “lack of understanding and adequate support.”104 Before 
taking adverse employment action, employers must conduct an individualized 
assessment of whether the treatment affects job performance with reasonable 
accommodation.105 This means that employers cannot have “blanket” policies 
forbidding any exceptions, like prescription drugs.106 Without blanket 
prohibitions, employers have less flexibility and efficiency in adverse 
employment decisions because the decisions must be specific. Yet, the 
individualized assessment also ensures that employers do not take “adverse 
employment action against employees or applicants based on any prejudice, 
 
 99. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(a)(2) (2018); Tiffanie Benfer et al., Addiction Under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, AM. B. 1, 11 https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law 
/2017/11/conference/papers/Kuczynski-ADDICTION-UNDER-THE-AMERICANS-WITH-DIS 
ABILITIES-ACT.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited on Sept. 29, 2018). 
 100. David L. Johnson, Managing Issues Posed by Opioids in the Workplace, TENN. EMP. L. 
LETTER, 2017, at 3. 
 101. Paton, supra note 85. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Benjamin E. Widener, Opioid Accommodation: Overview, Case Study and 
Recommendations, N.J. L. JOUR. (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/2018/08/10/ 
opioid-accommodation-overview-case-study-and-recommendations/?slreturn=20190019123417. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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misperception or lack of information about the employee’s lawful use of 
prescription drugs.”107 
Even if an employee can show he or she has a disability and he or she can 
perform the essential functions of the job, the employer can still discriminate 
against the employee if the employee poses a “direct threat.”108 This defense 
allows employers to fire, refuse to hire, demote, etc., employees who present a 
significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of that employee or 
others, which cannot be eliminated or reduced by a reasonable 
accommodation.109 If the opioid treatment is affecting workplace safety, such as 
in a situation where a patient taking prescription opioids is operating heavy 
machinery or doing physical labor for his/her job, the employee may be 
transferred or terminated, and the employer will still be in compliance with the 
law.110 This allows employers to maintain the same protections they currently 
have—that if they truly have an issue with the employee in terms of safety, the 
direct threat defense will protect employer workplace decisions. 
Furthermore, the direct threat defense also allows employers to stay aware 
of safety threats to the workplace, hire employees who can perform their job 
functions, and still terminate employees who are illegally abusing prescription 
drugs. To avoid liability, employers can simply have a specialized process for 
employees who test positive for legally prescribed drugs, have written job 
descriptions that detail what would be a safety concern and what is essential for 
the job, and focus on employee performance rather than history of abuse.111 
Though employers are losing some ability to terminate at-will those employees 
who are taking legally prescribed opioids, they are in turn gaining employees 
who, hopefully, are in less chronic pain, recovering from a history of addiction, 
or benefitting from one of the other short-term effects that could increase 
productivity through legally prescribed treatment.  
With employer protections in place as well, based on the current statutory 
language, though it may be difficult, employees who are being discriminated 
against based on their legally prescribed use of opioids can show that major life 
activities are affected or that there was a sustained perception of being regarded 
as disabled. As mentioned earlier, Congress passed the amendment to broaden 
the scope and application of the ADA, so, when faced with this language, courts 
should construe the “major life activity” and “regarded as” classifications as in 
line with our understanding of opioid use, treatment and prescribing behavior, 
and employer misperceptions. 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(3), 12113(a)–(b) (2006). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Widener, supra note 104. 
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IV.  CORRECTING THE APPLICATION OF THE ADAAA IN LEGAL OPIOID 
PRESCRIPTION USE 
Despite the legislative and regulatory intent to broaden statutory coverage 
for disabled individuals, courts continue to misapply a narrow interpretation that 
could in a way allow for legal prescription drug use to fall outside of coverage.112 
In a recently filed suit, EEOC v. Appalachian Wood Products, Inc., a district 
court has the opportunity to correctly apply broader coverage for those seeking 
treatment through legal opioid use.113  
As the potential widespread misapplication of anti-discrimination law 
looms, the EEOC filed a lawsuit on September 27, 2018 against a cabinet 
supplier, Appalachian Wood Products, Inc., claiming testing of legally 
prescribed drugs is a violation of the ADAAA.114 According to the complaint, 
Appalachian Wood Products, Inc. did not hire job applicants when prescription 
use was disclosed to the employer’s contracted medical provider.115 One 
applicant, Daub, was taking prescribed Suboxone to treat his seven-year opioid 
addiction following a back injury.116 The use of opioids “interfered with major 
life activities such as eating, sleeping and interacting with others.”117 However, 
on his job application, Daub responded that he was not taking medication that 
impaired his cognitive ability or motor function skills because he had not 
experienced either of those specific impairments as a result of his prescription.118 
After Daub disclosed the prescribed treatment to the employer’s chiropractor, 
the employer withdrew its offer of employment.119 The complaint claims, 
“Defendant refused to hire Daub on the basis of his record of a disability, past 
drug addiction, drug addiction recovery and related medical treatment, and 
because he was regarded as disabled . . . .”120 
This is the first case filed in which the plaintiff specifically argued that legal 
opioid prescription use is a disability under the ADAAA through side effects felt 
outside of work. Based on court interpretations of legal opioid treatment under 
the ADA and surrounding dicta on the ADAAA, however, we should be 
concerned about how courts may interpret the recent filing. We can use these 
 
 112. See Brynn Stylinski, Narrow Definitions: The Courts’ Resistance to the ADA Amendments 
Act, UNIV. CIN. L. REV. (May 14, 2015), https://uclawreview.org/2015/05/14/narrow-definitions-
the-courts-resistance-to-the-ada-amendments-act/. 
 113. See generally Complaint at 1, EEOC v. Appalachian Wood Prods., Inc., No. 18-00198 (D. 
Pa. Sept. 27, 2018); Press Release, supra note 36. 
 114. Complaint at 5–6, supra note 113; Press Release, supra note 36. 
 115. Complaint at 5, supra note 113. 
 116. Id. at 4. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 5. 
 120. Complaint at 5, supra note 113. 
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concerns to frame arguments for greater protection of those using opioids for 
legal treatment. 
A. An Individual Legally Using Opioids Can Be Considered Actually 
Disabled 
In order to meet the definition of “disabled,” an individual who claims he or 
she faced adverse action in the workplace based solely on use of legally 
prescribed opioids may first argue that his or her impairment “substantially 
limits one or more major life activities.”121 However, even after the intended 
expansion of coverage under the ADAAA, district courts in the same jurisdiction 
as Bates and affirmed by the Sixth Circuit continue to misapply the law against 
individuals legally using prescribed drugs.122 In Ferrari v. Ford Motor 
Company, after the plaintiff suffered a neck injury in 2000, he took pain 
medications and obtained a placement in human resources as a reasonable 
accommodation.123 
After his neck pain improved in late 2012 and wanting a new position 
without restrictions, the plaintiff sought for his restrictions to be lifted by the 
company physician, Dr. Brewer.124 Dr. Brewer met with the plaintiff’s treating 
physician, Dr. Kole, regarding the removal of the neck-related physical 
restrictions and the plaintiff’s use of Valium and morphine documented as of 
January 7, 2013.125 Although the plaintiff was not restricted by the neck pain, 
the dependence on opioids was determined as a restriction, and Dr. Kole found 
that the “plaintiff could physically perform the duties in the RMI position 
description, but would require three months to be weaned off of his pain 
medications.”126 There was conflicting evidence on whether the plaintiff was 
actually still taking the opioids, but regardless, the plaintiff was not transferred 
to the desired position.127 
The plaintiff filed a discrimination suit, claiming his disability was his neck 
injury under the ADA, which the court misapplied, rather than applying the 
ADAAA.128 Though the court found that the underlying disability, the neck 
injury, was a disability and covered by the ADA, the court still analyzed whether 
the plaintiff’s use of opioids was a disability because the use was the “stated 
basis for defendant’s adverse employment decision.”129 As in Bates, the court 
 
 121. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2017). 
 122. See generally Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 96 F. Supp. 3d 668, 668, 678–79 (E.D. Mich. 
2015). 
 123. Id. at 670–71. 
 124. Id. at 671. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Ferrari, 96 F. Supp. 3d at 671–72. 
 128. Id. at 672, 674. 
 129. Id. at 675. 
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wrongly used the employer’s basis for termination, limitations on work because 
of legally prescribed drugs, rather than the employee’s actual claim to analyze 
the definition of disability. The court reasoned, then, that opioid use “cannot 
serve as the basis for an actual disability” because it cannot limit a major life 
activity.130 The court cited a case finding that addiction can only be a disability 
through the second and third prongs, conflating the plaintiff’s legal opioid 
treatment with the rule for “drug-addicted individuals.”131 Given our knowledge 
of the uses and effects of legal prescription opioid use, this generalized bar on 
protection is an improper application of the ADAAA. 
The conflation of legally prescribed treatment with addiction should not be 
used to categorically exclude those seeking treatment from the protections of the 
first prong of the ADAAA. The congressional intent of the ADA’s amendment 
was greater protection. Thus, if a plaintiff can show a major life activity is 
substantially limited, the plaintiff should be able to show the first prong, even if 
as a result of legal drug use.132 As mentioned earlier, we are becoming 
increasingly aware of opioid side effects, such as drowsiness, altered eating 
habits, and behavioral changes, and the way such effects impact various life 
activities outside of work.133 Therefore, as a matter of public policy, as well as 
following congressional intent, the courts should broaden the interpretation of 
“major life activities” to mirror our knowledge of legal opioid use side effects, 
rather than categorically exclude and conflate legal prescription drug use with 
addiction.  
This expansion could be applied in EEOC v. Appalachian Wood Products, 
Inc. if the plaintiffs avoid claiming that “work” is the impaired major life activity 
and, instead, argue that the effects of their legal opioid prescription impair other 
areas of their lives, such as sleeping or eating. In the upcoming EEOC case, the 
plaintiffs first argue that the class of applicants was discriminated against based 
on their “actual disabilities.”134 One of the applicants, Daub, who was legally 
taking prescribed Suboxone to treat a previous addiction, argued he had a 
disability from the effects of the prescription that substantially limited major life 
activities, such as eating, sleeping, and interacting with others.135 Based on the 
expanded definition of “major life activity,” which includes eating and sleeping, 
the court should find these impacts constitute a disability under the first prong.  
As mentioned earlier, the employer’s drug testing or application questions 
may put at issue whether the impairments also limit work ability. Therefore, the 
employee should not be hired because he or she cannot perform the essential 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 78. 
 133. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 6. 
 134. Complaint at 1, supra note 113. 
 135. Id. at 4. 
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functions of the job and is therefore not qualified.136 However, the plaintiffs do 
not have to argue work is the impaired major life activity, thus reducing the 
likelihood that they might be deemed unqualified. Assuming cognitive ability 
and motor function skills were questioned in the job application because they 
are essential functions of the job, the court should find the plaintiffs are able to 
perform the essential functions of the job because, for example, plaintiff Daub 
answered that he had not experienced “either impaired cognitive ability or 
impaired motor function skills as a result of his use of Suboxone.”137 In 
answering this way, Daub has already remarked that he is a qualified individual 
who can perform the essential job functions, while still being able to argue other 
major life activities are impaired. 
B. An Individual Legally Using Opioids May Have a History of an 
Impairment 
Under the second prong of having a record of a disability, plaintiffs must 
show they were discriminated against because they had a history of an 
impairment, such as recurring chronic pain or a history of addiction, which 
substantially limited a major life activity.138 In Ferrari, the court found the 
plaintiff did not have a record that the plaintiff’s opioid use constituted an injury 
in the past.139 The court’s conclusory analysis does not take into account the 
plaintiff’s underlying condition, which was considered a disability under the first 
prong, nor the length of time the plaintiff had taken opioids. Considering the 
opioid use was acknowledged as his medical history in his medical record and 
this is the reason the plaintiff was not transferred, the court should have spent 
more time considering whether the plaintiff’s medical history of opioid use was 
the reason for his discrimination. 
Although opioids may not traditionally be prescribed long-term due to their 
addictive side effects,140 short-term treatment through opioids may be listed on 
medical records, similar to history of addiction. This listing could be harmful for 
employment if employees are only protected based on history of addiction, not 
history of legally prescribed medications. In EEOC v. Appalachian Wood 
Products, Inc., the plaintiffs argue they were also discriminated against based 
on history of drug use.141 Indeed, only after the chiropractor told the defendant 
 
 136. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2006) (amended 2008). 
 137. Complaint at 4, supra note 113. 
 138. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B) (2017). 
 139. Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 96 F. Supp. 3d 668, 675 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
 140. But see Information About Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT), U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm600092.htm (last 
updated Feb. 14, 2019) (explaining how buprenorphine, methadone, and naltrexone, when 
partnered with psychosocial support, can be safe and effective at treating opioid use disorders and 
dependency on a continuing basis). 
 141. Complaint at 4, supra note 113. 
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about Daub’s history of Suboxone use was his application revoked.142 Because 
addiction itself is protected by the ADAAA, Daub would be in a better legal 
position under the second prong if he had struggled with a past opioid addiction 
(which, coincidentally, he did) than if he was legally taking opioids pursuant to 
a prescription. This is because a history of addiction is protected, while a history 
of legal prescription drug use is not. 
As noted earlier, with the raised awareness of opioid use also comes grave 
misperceptions that all use will lead to addiction when, in reality, short-term use 
can have positive results for patients.143 If employers discriminate based on 
medical records, such as in Ferrari, plaintiffs will continue to be discriminated 
against for legally prescribed treatment or may hide important medical 
information from their record to avoid discrimination. This is a policy issue 
where plaintiffs would be in a better legal position to abuse the drugs than to 
take them as prescribed because, if drug use or its effects are written on patients’ 
records in the future, recovery from addiction would be covered while prescribed 
use would not. If the court finds this is not in violation of the ADAAA, the 
consequence could hinder an employee’s ability to seek treatment or disclose 
legally prescribed drug use to other doctors, fearing that doing so could lead to 
discrimination. To encourage free flow of information between doctors and 
patients and to ensure compliance with legal usage of opioids, the court should 
protect medical records in terms of drug history, including prescribed treatment. 
Taking this into consideration, courts should apply the second prong to 
protect medical records that include histories of legally prescribed treatments. 
Additionally, the second prong requires that the plaintiff show an impacted 
major life activity, thus facing the same problem as under the first prong.144 To 
avoid this barrier, the plaintiff may instead have a stronger argument under the 
third prong. 
C. An Individual Legally Using Opioids May Be Regarded as Disabled 
With the prevalence of employer misperceptions, if a plaintiff cannot meet 
one of the above prongs because he or she cannot show a substantial limitation 
of a major life activity, the third prong is likely the strongest argument. 
Historically, though, plaintiffs have still faced issues under this prong. 
Even under Ferrari, the court held the plaintiff was not regarded as disabled 
because the impairment was only transitory.145 Because the plaintiff could be 
weaned off the opioids within three to four months, the legal treatment was not 
protected as a disability.146 According to Paragraph (3)(B) of Section 12102 of 
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 144. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)–(B) (2017). 
 145. Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 96 F. Supp. 3d 668, 675 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
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the Act, the third prong does not apply to “impairments that are transitory and 
minor,” which means the duration is six months or less.147 The court did not 
consider whether the opioid use would be protected as an episodic disability, nor 
did it explain why the impairments were considered “minor” if they were 
sufficient to prevent work. The court’s interpretation, in limiting protection to 
those who use legally prescribed opioids for over six months, might encourage 
users to prolong use to be regarded as disabled. The decision might also 
discourage following treatment by not taking prescribed opioids in order to 
prevent being regarded as a drug user and still not being covered by the ADAAA 
because the use is transitory. 
Under EEOC v. Appalachian Wood Products, Inc., the plaintiffs argue the 
defendant failed to hire job applicants that were regarded as disabled under the 
third prong.148 In fact, the complaint says, “Defendant regarded Daub as having 
a disability by disqualifying him and denying him hire because of his non-
transitory and non-minor impairment, past drug addiction, drug addiction 
recovery and related medical treatment.”149 In this way, the plaintiffs are trying 
to avoid the Ferrari reasoning by arguing the past addiction and current legal 
use are not simply transitory, particularly by arguing the plaintiff abused drugs 
for years and was using Suboxone, which does not affect just minor 
impairments, for treatment. By making this argument, the plaintiffs are more in 
line with our current understanding of legal treatment—that the positive effects 
of legal treatment are established for short-term use and such use can be 
incredibly beneficial to diminish long-term pain. 
Additionally, as a matter of public policy, courts should interpret drug use 
as episodic, rather than transitory, to avoid prolonged use for better legal 
standing and disability protection. Even if the use was under six months, given 
the misperceptions of opioid treatment, it is possible that the defendant falsely 
classified the plaintiffs as current recurring illegal drug users and did not, at the 
time of revoking the offer, regard the plaintiffs as having “transitory” use of 
legal treatment. Therefore, the court should find that the use was not regarded as 
transitory. 
V.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
If EEOC v. Appalachian Wood Products, Inc. does not find in favor of the 
plaintiffs, but rather, the court finds for the ability to discriminate based on legal 
opioid treatment, the effect could deter employees from seeking relieving 
treatment. These employees may be incentivized to hide such treatment from 
important resources, such as employer physicians. If patients are deterred from 
using opioids as treatment because of lack of protection from adverse 
 
 147. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12102(3)(B). 
 148. See Complaint at 3, supra note 113. 
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employment actions, they may instead face chronic pain, addiction, pain from 
cancer treatment, or many of the health issues legal opioid treatment is 
prescribed to diminish. 
Based on our new understandings of opioid side effects, the potential relief 
for patients needing short-term use, the danger in incentivizing long-term use, 
and common misconceptions that could lead to more adverse employment 
decisions, courts should embrace the ADAAA’s more expansive disability 
definition to cover legal opioid treatment. By doing so, the judicial system would 
offer protection for medically-prescribed use in a way that would be monitored 
by physicians. Even though it may add a small upfront cost to employers, 
expanding the ADA’s definition of disability would reduce employee pain and 
drug abuse while improving work productivity and long-term treatment results. 
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